June 29, 2004 Chapter 9 Secession, the eu, and Lessons from the U. S. Civil War: Why Reconciliation Happened

Richard J. Sweeney *

McDonough School of Business

Georgetown University

Washington, DC 20057

(O) 1-202-687-3742

fax 1-202-687-7639, - 4130

email sweeneyr@georgetown.edu

Abstract: The post-Civil War reconciliation between the North and the South is a very rare event in the history of civil wars. The South was thoroughly beaten. Top generals, particularly Robert E. Lee, saw further fighting as “useless effusion of blood.” There was no call by top Confederate leaders for continuing the fight with the type of bushwacking that occurred in Missouri and Kansas. Reconstruction is often thought of as harsh, but compared to the standards of history Confederates were by and large treated well after the Civil War. Within a decade or so of the end of the Civil War, conservative white elites had established political, economic and social dominance in the South. They had lost their “slave property” and the “government of our own.” They could never get back slavery, and a government of their own was not worth fighting for. There was little reason for the kind of persistent low-level guerilla warfare that often occurs after civil wars, or the organization of a succession of rebellions.

Abstract: The post-Civil War reconciliation between the North and the South is a very rare event in the history of civil wars. The South was thoroughly beaten. Top generals, particularly Robert E. Lee, saw further fighting as “useless effusion of blood.” There was no call by top Confederate leaders for continuing the fight with the type of bushwacking that occurred in Missouri and Kansas. Reconstruction is often thought of as harsh, but compared to the standards of history Confederates were by and large treated well after the Civil War. Within a decade or so of the end of the Civil War, conservative white elites had established political, economic and social dominance in the South. They had lost their “slave property” and the “government of our own.” They could never get back slavery, and a government of their own was not worth fighting for. There was little reason for the kind of persistent low-level guerilla warfare that often occurs after civil wars, or the organization of a succession of rebellions.

“With malice towards none, with charity for all … let us strive on … to bind up the nation’s wounds, … to do all which may achieve and cherish a lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.”

Sweeney (2003) argues that, in designing a new constitution, the European Union should take great care to remove issues that might lead to future attempts at secession. He argues that, in some plausible circumstances, secession might be a disaster for the EU. Secession by Ireland or Estonia need not be serious and could be handled amicably. The danger arises from the possibility that the EU will split into large, hostile federations; this is what happened when the Confederacy split from the Union in 1860-1861. In particular, if the EU should split into multiple federations, with one centered on France and another on Germany, the possibility of hostile relations would be an important danger. He further argues that using force to keep a region from seceding is likely to have severe consequences, because even victory is highly unlikely to lead to reconciliation; in the same way, war between regions that result from secession is likely to lead to periods of peace between wars, not reconciliation.

Attempts at secession often provoke civil war, as happened in the U.S. Defeat of the seceding region on the battlefield often does not end the conflict. Rather, the fighting may degenerate into guerilla warfare. In other cases, fighting dies down for a period, but underground resistance is organized, and rebellion occurs again. Neither form of continued fighting happened in the case of the U.S. Civil War. The reconciliation in the U.S. is a very rare result, however, and is not to be expected in most cases of secession that degenerate into civil war. This paper explores why the Civil War ended once and for all. It shows that the favorable circumstances the U.S. faced are unlikely to recur in the future. If the EU were to split into large, hostile blocs, warfare might well occur (Sweeney 2003), but this paper makes clear from examining the U.S. case that battlefield victory is unlikely to lead to reconciliation.

It is not clear at first glance why the North and South reconciled, and in particular, why the South did not continue hostilities with guerilla actions, or with underground organization, and then later rebellions. Put another way, a series of questions arise. Why did the South lose, in the sense of its armies surrendering in April-June 1865? Why did the South accept this defeat rather than continue to fight in a guerilla war in partisan bands? Why did the South not organize an underground resistance movement, aimed at eventually overthrowing the federal government on Southern territory and reestablishing the Confederacy? Why was there no later rebellion?

There is a huge literature on why the South lost, or the North won, in the sense that Confederate generals and the Confederate government were reduced to the desperate situation they faced just before Lee’s surrender at Appomattox on April 9. This literature is unanimous that the South was at that point unable to continue the war in the same style as before, with large bodies of men in the tens of thousands, set piece battles, and defense of fixed positions and large amounts of territory. None of the top Southern commanders believed that further conventional fighting would produce results worth the cost. Why did the South not turn to other forms of warfare, resistance and organization to continue its struggle? Instead, reconciliation started early to replace struggle, and the attempts at struggle that occurred were few, weak and short-lived.

The Polish Home Army fought on after defeat by the Germans and Soviets. Ireland experienced hundreds of years of rebellion. Both the Polish and the Irish continued to desire to establish independent countries. Similarly, when the Confederacy was founded, many Southerners looked on “a country of our own” as a good thing, in and of itself. Others, however, viewed it more as a means for avoiding the dangers they saw from remaining in the Union. Many of these dangers, though hardly all, were centered on the issue of slavery. The Union might cause the economic death of slavery, or might emancipate the slaves with or without compensation. Protecting their “slave property” was one reason Southerners contemplated secession. Further, most Southerners and many Northerners believed that free blacks and whites could not live together in peace. By April, 1865, it was clear that owners of “slave property” were going to lose this property, and that it was unlikely that it could ever be reclaimed, no matter what happened politically in the territory of the Confederacy. Even if a new Confederacy were to arise, it would be hard to re-enslave the black population and to re-allocate it among claimants, and all the harder the greater the amount of time before the new Confederacy arose. But, as noted, another part of Southern concerns about slavery turned on social, economic and political questions about the status of blacks. It soon became clear that southern states could be part of the Union and still keep white-supremacy control over blacks to an extent that satisfied even hard-line whites.

The remainder of this paper concentrates on two issues. The first is why the Confederate armies surrendered and their men virtually all returned home in peace in April and May, 1865, rather than breaking up into small groups to continue the fight in the form of a guerilla war. On the one hand, Abraham Lincoln argued that once southern soldiers had surrendered and returned to their homes they would not fight further. “Let them once surrender and reach their homes, [and] they won’t take up arms again.” On the other hand, one might argue that even if Confederate leaders wanted to continue resistance in other ways, surrender made sense. If some of the troops were to continue with guerilla warfare, all the troops would be better off if the Southern armies were surrendered and the men and most officers paroled to return to their homes. The second issue, then, is why, having surrendered and returned home in peace, the former Confederates did not organize an underground and pursue both urban and rural warfare. This question is particularly relevant because the South underwent Congressional Reconstruction, viewed as particularly harsh, from 1867 to 1877.

1. Confederate Generals Surrender

The reconciliation started in part because of the behavior of the chief Confederate generals. They surrendered their troops, sent them home, and by and large urged them in going to be good citizens; Union generals by and large were helpful in this effort. At the time of Appomattox, April 9, 1865, Lee led the Army of Northern Virginia, and Joseph Johnston commanded the remaining Confederate troops in the Carolinas. Richard Taylor led the troops in Alabama, Mississippi and Western Louisiana, and Edmund Kirby Smith the troops in the Trans-Mississippi theater (Texas, Arkansas, Missouri and Eastern Louisiana).

Most historians conclude that Robert E. Lee played a substantial role in the reconciliation of North and South, starting with his surrender at Appomattox, and continuing with his steadfast view that former Confederates should do all in their power to reconcile with the re-united U.S. Lee was from a distinguished old Virginia family that had played a large role in the Revolutionary War and in the foundation of the United States. His father, Harry “Light horse Harry” Lee was a military hero in the Revolution. His wife Mary Custis was a great granddaughter of Marta Custis Washington, and thus a step-great granddaughter of George Washington.¹ Foote (1974, p. 942) writes that on April 9, 1865, Lee asked his generals, Longstreet, Mahone and Alexander their “opinion of on the question of surrender.

Countering with a question of his own, [Longstreet] asked whether sacrifice of the Army of Northern Virginia would in any way help the cause elsewhere. Lee said he thought not. ‘Then your situation speaks for itself,’ Old Peter told him. Mahone felt the same…. Alexander disagreed…. [H]e proposed that the troops take to the woods, individually and in small groups, under orders to report to the governors of their respective states. That way, he believed, two thirds of the army would avoid capture by the Yankees… Lee heard the young brigadier out, then replied in measured tones to his plan. ‘We must consider its effect on the country as a whole,’ he told him. ‘Already it is demoralized by four years of war. If I took your advice, the men would be without rations and under no control of officers. They would be compelled to rob and steal in order to live. They would become mere bands of marauders, and the enemy’s cavalry would pursue them and overrun many sections that they may never have occasion to visit. We would bring on a state of affairs it would take the country years to recover from. And as for myself, you young fellows might go bushwacking, but the only dignified course for me would be to go to General Grant and surrender myself and take the consequences of my acts….’ [Alexander long afterwards wrote], ‘I had not a single word to say in reply…. He had answered my suggestion from a plane so far above it that I was ashamed of having made it.’”²

During the siege of Richmond-Petersburg, Grant and Sherman had met with Lincoln at City Point, starting March 24, 1865 (Winik, pp. 64-68), where Lincoln lodged on the River Queen. There

Lincoln announced to Grant and Sherman what would become known as the River Queen doctrine, offering the South the most generous terms: “to get the deluded men of the rebel armies disarmed and back to their homes… Let them once surrender and reach their homes, [and] they won’t take up arms again.” And further, “Let them all go, officers and all, I want submission, and no more bloodshed… I want no one punished; treat them liberally all around. We want those people to return to their allegiance to the Union and to submit to the laws.”^{3­, 4}
Very likely based on these discussions, in the final sentence of the surrender document, Grant stipulated where the surrendered troops were to go and how they were to behave. He wrote,

each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. (Foote, p. 947.)

Further, during his meeting with Lee at Appomattox, Grant ordered provision of rations for Lee’s defeated army. After the meeting, he also stopped celebrations by the Union army: “The war is over. The Rebels are our countrymen again.” (Simpson 2000, p. 436.)⁷ The surrender ceremony (April 12) was dignified on both sides, and spared the Confederates humiliation. McPherson (1988, p. 850) reports Federal Major General Joshua Chamberlin’s description of how the Federals gave the Confederates the most honorable salute by holding their rifles at the “carry arms” position, and the Confederates returned the salute in the same way. (Freeman 1936-1938, Vol. IV, pp. 745-752, also describes the surrender.)

In the meantime, Lee had distributed a farewell address to his army (General Order Number 9, April 10 1965) that urged his men to be proud of themselves and return home in peace, and he made as clear as possible that the war was over (Dowdey and Manarin 1961, pp. 934-935, italics added):

After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.

By the terms of the agreement officers and men can return to their homes and remain there until exchanged. You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed, and I earnestly pray that a Merciful God will extend to you His blessings and protection.

Lee’s stature in the South was great. Gallagher (1997) presents one view of his influence.

Edward Porter Alexander, Lee’s chief artilleryman, had urged guerilla war (see above). Later, he concluded that “the exceedingly liberal treatment” in Grant’s terms “could only be ascribed to a policy of conciliation deliberately entered upon.” (Simpson 2000, p. 439.) Grant made further attempts at conciliation. For example, he declined to visit the defeated Richmond (April 12) lest his presence:

… might lead to demonstrations which would only wound the feelings of the residents, and we ought not to do anything at such a time which would add to their sorrows. (Simpson 2000, p.440.)⁸
Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston wrote to General William T. Sherman, asking for surrender terms, on April 14, 1865, Good Friday, coincidentally the day Lincoln was shot. Sherman’s army was closing in on Johnston’s; as Sherman later told Grant, he feared that

Johnston overtaken, might ‘allow his army to disperse into guerilla bands’ and thereby cause the war to be ‘prolonged indefinitely.’ In this mood, Sherman at first negotiated a surrender with Johnston that covered all remaining Confederate troops (April 18, 1865). Sherman’s intention was that ‘[A]ll the gray armies … would disband en masse, rather than fragment themselves into guerilla bands which might disturb and bedevil the nation for years to come.’ (Foote, 1986, p. 993, italics added.)

Sherman had written to Grant a week before Richard Taylor’s surrender that:

I now apprehend that the rebel armies will disperse, and instead of dealing with six of seven states, we will have to deal with numberless bands of desperadoes, headed by such men as Mosby, Forrest, … and others who know not or care not for danger and its consequences. (Foote 1896, p. 1000, italics added.)
Sherman, however, misunderstood and perhaps underestimated the moral position of Confederate cavalry commanders.

Colonel John S. Mosby, commander of a squad of cavalry rangers, was in a natural position to turn to guerilla warfare in Virginia; he never had more than 200 troops, and they operated in small platoons of a few to a few dozen troopers (Winik, p 156). In mid-April, Mosby sent a messenger to Lee, asking for advice; Lee responded to the messenger, “Go home, all you boys who fought with me. Help to build up the shattered fortunes of our old state.” (Winik, p. 325). On April 21, Mosby disbanded his rangers, remarking, “We are soldiers, not highwaymen.” (Foote, 1986, p. 1000.) Mosby himself did not surrender, but tried to reach Johnston’s army; when he heard of Johnston’s surrender, he soon asked for parole.

Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest, commanding all cavalry in Richard Taylor’s district, decided on May 8, 1865, to surrender rather than fight on, perhaps from Mexico. For one thing, Forrest despised actions by Quantrill and other bushwackers.¹⁰ On May 9, he issued a farewell statement to his troops that made clear that in his view the war was over, and his men should go home and be good citizens (Winik, p. 320-322). He wrote (Foote 1986, pp. 1001-1002, italics added):

Soldiers:

Civil war, such as you have just passed through, naturally engenders feelings of animosity, hatred, and revenge. It is our duty to divest ourselves of all such feelings, and, so far as we have it in our power to do so, to cultivate feelings towards those with whom we have so long contested and heretofore so widely but honestly differed. Neighborhood feuds, personal animosities, and private differences should be blotted out, and when you return home a manly, straightforward course of conduct will secure the respect even of your enemies…. The attempt to establish a separate and independent confederation has failed… You have been good soldiers, you can be good citizens. Obey the laws, preserve your honor, and the government to which you have surrendered can afford to be and will be magnanimous.

Other potential guerrilla leaders were rounded up. On May 8, General Joe Wheeler was captured in Georgia in his attempt to get to the Trans-Mississippi. On May 30, Confederate General John B. Hood, accompanied by only a few aides, and under orders to go to the Trans-Mississippi, was picked up by federal troops while still east of the Mississippi, and the next day was granted his parole.

Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi district, sent General Simon Buckner to Canby at New Orleans on May 25, and Buckner agreed the next day to surrender on the same terms as had Lee, Johnston and Taylor. On June 2, Kirby Smith signed the surrender documents on a federal ship in Galveston Bay, Texas. Not trusting the generosity of the Union government, Kirby Smith joined General Jo Shelby and other Confederate troops in escaping to Mexico. These troops never intended, however, to carry on the war from Mexico; many of them later drifted back to the U.S. Confederate Brigadier General Stand Watie, a Cherokee commanding Indian troops from several tribes, was the last Confederate general officer to surrender on June 23, 1865, at Doakville in Indian Territory (later Oklahoma).